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This paper analyzes the protection of a common pool resource (CPR) through the manage-
ment of information. Speci￿cally, we examine an entry deterrence model between an incumbent
perfectly informed about the initial stock of a CPR and an uninformed potential entrant. In
our model, the appropriation of the CPR by the incumbent reduces both players￿future pro￿ts
from exploiting the resource. In the case of complete information, we show that the incumbent
operating in a high-stock common pool overexploits the CPR during the ￿rst period since it
does not internalize the negative external e⁄ect that its ￿rst-period exploitation imposes on the
entrant￿ s future pro￿ts. This ine¢ ciency, however, is absent when the commons totally regener-
ate across periods. Under incomplete information, we identify an additional form of ine¢ ciency.
In particular, the incumbent operating in a low-stock CPR underexploits the resource in order
to signal the low available stock to potential entrants, deterring entry.
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11 Introduction
The ￿tragedy of the commons￿has been analyzed by scholars in di⁄erent disciplines. Speci￿cally,
the ￿tragedy￿examines how open access common pool resources (CPR), such as ￿shing grounds,
forests and water systems are prone to overexploitation. Indeed, users do not internalize the
external e⁄ect that their independent decisions impose on other agents also exploiting the commons,
leading to an overuse of the resource.1 As a result, multiple studies focus on how to prevent the
overexploitation of the commons by analyzing the CPR game as part of a larger environment in
which agents interact and examining whether agents select socially optimal actions.
This paper follows a similar approach by analyzing the CPR game within a context of incomplete
information among players. We investigate under which conditions this informational setting helps
prevent the ￿tragedy of the commons.￿ In particular, we consider an incumbent who privately
observes the commons￿initial stock and an entrant who infers the level of the stock by observing the
incumbent￿ s previous exploitation, deciding then whether or not to join the CPR. This environment
describes multiple CPRs which are initially operated by an incumbent, who usually gathers more
accurate information about the available stock than potential entrants. For instance, Pinkerton
and Ramirez [2] study CPRs in seven coastal ￿shing communities in Loreto (Mexico), where local
￿shers have access to more precise information about the state of the stock than those located
at di⁄erent ￿shing grounds, who base their entry decision upon the incumbents￿actions. Our
paper analyzes agents￿use of the resource in these informational contexts by focusing on how the
incumbent￿ s exploitation of the CPR can convey or conceal information about the actual stock to
potential entrants. In addition, we investigate under which conditions the incumbent￿ s incentives
to deter entry can serve as a tool to actually promote the conservation of the resource.
As our benchmark, we ￿rst study equilibrium appropriation under complete information. When
the initial stock is low, the entrant does not join the CPR. The incumbent is hence the only agent
exploiting the resource across time, fully internalizing the negative e⁄ect that an increase in ￿rst-
period exploitation causes on its own future pro￿ts. In this case, the incumbent exploits the resource
at the socially optimal level. In contrast, when the initial stock is high the entrant joins the CPR
and both incumbent and entrant compete for the resource in the second period of the game, leading
to the standard overexploitation result in CPR games, i.e., the ￿tragedy of the commons￿emerges.
Furthermore, we identify an additional form of ine¢ ciency. In particular, the incumbent does not
internalize the negative external e⁄ect of its ￿rst-period appropriation on the entrant￿ s second-
period pro￿ts. Hence, the resource is overexploited not only in the second but also in the ￿rst
period.
We then introduce incomplete information in the CPR game. First, we show that in the
separating equilibrium the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation conveys information about the
1Note that agents exploiting a CPR hence share similar incentives with those competing in a prisoner￿ s dilemma
game, or in a public good game as in Bergstrom et al. [1]. In particular, the equilibrium of the game does not
necessarily coincide with the Pareto optimum for the group.
2actual level of the stock to the potential entrant, attracting entry when the stock is high but
deterring entry when it is low. In particular, when the initial stock is high entry occurs, alike
in the complete information environment, inducing the incumbent to overexploit the resource in
both the ￿rst and second period. Mason and Polasky [3] describe an example about the Hudson￿ s
Bay Company that can support this result. Faced with the threat of entry from French furtraders
during the 18th century, the company increased beaver harvests. Rather than dissuading them
from entering, French furtraders built an outpost in the area in 1741. Hence, the overexploitation
of the resource by the Hudson￿ s Bay Company could be interpreted as a signal of a high initial
stock by the French furtraders.
When the initial stock is low, in contrast, we show that the incumbent￿ s appropriation is be-
low that of complete information. Speci￿cally, in the separating equilibrium the incumbent facing
low-stock commons underexploits the CPR in order to deter entry. The introduction of incomplete
information moves this incumbent away from the complete-information equilibrium and thus from
the social optimum. The separating equilibrium hence presents the same ine¢ ciencies as the com-
plete information game when the stock is high, but identi￿es an additional ine¢ ciency ￿ associated
with the underexploitation of the commons￿ when the stock is low. Importantly, this ine¢ ciency
is novel in the literature of CPRs and arises from our incomplete information setting, where the in-
cumbent operating in a low-stock common pool conveys the state of the stock to potential entrants
in order to prevent entry. The case of the silver hake provides an interesting example of this type of
informative signaling. After two decades of intense exploitation by mechanized U.S. and Canadian
￿shing boats in the North Atlantic from 1960 to 1980, the available stock became signi￿cantly
depleted. This low stock led to a reduction in the number of vessels and annual catches. More
importantly, incumbent ￿sheries have consistently underexploited the resource below its annual
sustainable catch since the late 1990s; see United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization [4].
Such strategy can be interpreted as a signal to potential entrants, informing them that the stock,
despite experiencing a mild recovery, has not yet become su¢ ciently high to support the entry of
additional vessels.2
When both types of incumbent choose the same ￿rst-period exploitation (in the pooling equi-
librium) no information is revealed to the entrant deterring entry. This result suggests that the
incumbent operating a high-stock commons can deter entry as if it owned a property right for the
use of the resource. Therefore, the informational asymmetry among players acts in this case as an
￿implicit protection right￿for the incumbent. We then evaluate the e¢ ciency properties of this
equilibrium outcome. In the second period, we ￿nd that the ￿tragedy of the commons￿does not
emerge since the incumbent is still the only agent exploiting the resource. In the ￿rst period we
2Underexploitation has also been reported in several other ￿shing grounds. For instance, Haughton [5] highlights
the underuse of black￿n tuna, dolphin￿sh and diamond back squids, among others, in the Caribbean region. Similarly,
a comprehensive study by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization [4] indicates the underexploitation of
the Argentine anchovy in the Southern Atlantic and the yellow￿n sole in the Paci￿c Northwest. The underexploitation
observed in the previous examples could be explained by the di¢ culty of access or the ￿shing technology. Our paper
suggests that incomplete information can potentially exacerbate this underexploitation.
3show that the pooling exploitation level coincides with the social optimum when the initial stock is
low. When the initial stock is high, however, the pooling equilibrium lies below the social optimum,
and hence the high-stock incumbent underexploits the resource during the ￿rst period.
We ￿nally compare the e¢ ciency properties of separating and pooling equilibria. When the
initial stock is high, we show that the separating equilibrium supports an overexploitation of the
commons, while the pooling equilibrium predicts an underexploitation of the resource. A precise
policy recommendation would hence depend on which type of ine¢ ciency (under or overexploita-
tion) society prefers to avoid the most. If social preferences assign a larger welfare loss to the
overexploitation than to the underexploitation of the commons, then our results imply that en-
vironmental regulators would increase social welfare by promoting the pooling equilibrium, e.g.,
setting a quota. Otherwise, the separating equilibrium becomes welfare improving. This policy
makes the separating equilibrium less attractive for the incumbent, inducing it towards pooling
equilibrium appropriation levels. Our ￿ndings hence provide an additional role for quotas, a policy
tool often used to deal with CPRs.
Several studies examine under which circumstances the tragedy of the commons is ameliorated.
The main approaches can be grouped into two broad categories, where studies either: (1) modify
individual payo⁄s so that agents￿strategic incentives become di⁄erent from those in a CPR game,
Ostrom [6] and Ostrom et al. [7]; or (2) insert the unmodi￿ed CPR game into an enlarged structure,
e.g., allowing for the game to be repeated along time, Baland and Platteau [8].3 This paper
contributes to the second approach by introducing incomplete information in a CPR game. Other
authors have theoretically and experimentally analyzed uncertainty regarding the pro￿tability of
the CPR; see Suleiman and Rapoport [15], Suleiman et al. [16] and Apesteguia [17]. Unlike our
paper, this literature considers that all players have access to the same information about the
resource, thus not allowing for informational asymmetries among players. Our study o⁄ers hence
two advantages: ￿rst, it examines informational settings where an incumbent holds more accurate
information about a resource than potential entrants, which might apply to many CPRs such as
￿sheries. Second, the results show under which conditions the incumbent might choose to actually
overprotect the commons, because such overprotection deters entry.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on entry deterrence in the commons, as Mason
and Polasky [3], who assume complete information among players. By allowing for incomplete
information and signaling, we compare equilibrium behavior under complete and incomplete in-
formation. Therefore, this paper relates to the literature on entry deterrence in signaling games.
Usual entry deterrence models assume that the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period action (e.g., price setting
by a monopolist) does not a⁄ect incumbent and entrant￿ s future pro￿ts; see Milgrom and Roberts
3Building upon the seminal work of Hotelling [9] and Hardin [10], several studies analyze CPR games in a dynamic
context under complete information; see Levhari and Mirman [11], Reinganum and Stokey [12] and Dutta and
Sundaram [13]. For a comprehensive review of the CPR literature see Faysee [14].
4[18], Matthews and Mirman [19] and Bagwell and Ramey [20]. In our model, in contrast, the in-
cumbent￿ s ￿rst-period exploitation depletes the CPR, thus a⁄ecting its second-period appropriation
and reducing its pro￿ts. More importantly, it also a⁄ects the entrant￿ s second-period pro￿ts, thus
imposing a negative external e⁄ect on the entrant, unlike Polasky and Bin [21] where agents do
not compete for the same stock in the commons. This paper hence provides an explicit analysis of
signaling games where agents￿actions cause external e⁄ects, and compares it with signaling mod-
els where externalities are absent. Therefore our study is in the line of signaling games in which
one player￿ s ￿rst-period actions a⁄ect another player￿ s second-period pro￿ts, such as Spence [22,
23], where a worker￿ s education can raise his second-period productivity, thus increasing the ￿rm￿ s
second-period pro￿ts afterwards.
The following section describes the model. Section three examines the equilibrium under com-
plete information. Section four introduces the signaling game and compares exploitation levels
under both informational contexts. Finally, section ￿ve concludes.
2 Model
Consider a common pool resource (CPR), such as ￿shing grounds or forests, where an incumbent
(Firm 1) initially exploits the commons and an entrant (Firm 2) analyzes whether or not to enter.
There are no entry barriers and the initial stock of the CPR is either low or high, ￿K = f￿L;￿Hg.
We ￿rst analyze the case where entrant and incumbent are informed about the CPR￿ s initial stock,
and afterwards the case in which the entrant is uninformed. For compactness, let us thereafter refer
to the incumbent operating in a low (high) stock common pool as the low-stock (high-stock) incum-
bent. In particular, consider a two-stage game where, in the ￿rst stage, the incumbent operates as
a monopolist and decides its appropriation level x1 > 0. In the second stage of the game a potential
entrant, observing the incumbent￿ s appropriation level in the ￿rst period, chooses whether or not
to join the incumbent. If entry occurs, agents compete for the CPR and simultaneously select their
appropriation levels q1 and q2, for the incumbent and entrant, respectively.
First stage. In the ￿rst stage of the game, the incumbent appropriates x1, with an associated
total cost of c(x1;￿K), which is increasing and convex in appropriation, i.e., cx1 > 0 and cx1x1 > 0.
In addition, the marginal cost of appropriation is decreasing in the available stock ￿K, i.e., cx1￿ ￿
0. Henceforth, we assume that all functions are continuous and di⁄erentiable in all arguments.
For simplicity, we assume that incumbent and entrant sell their appropriation in an international
market, where their sales represent a small share of the total market for the good.4 Hence, during
the ￿rst period the incumbent is the only agent exploiting the resource, obtaining monopoly pro￿ts
of MK
1 (x1) ￿ x1 ￿ c(x1;￿K) where K = fH;Lg.
4Alternatively, both agents sell their appropriation at a price p, normalized to one during both periods.
5Second stage, No entry. During the second period, if entry does not occur, the incumbent
appropriates q1 > 0 obtaining the following monopoly pro￿ts
M
K
1 (q1;x1) ￿ q1 ￿ c1(q1;x1;￿K;￿) where K = fH;Lg,
where c1(q1;x1;￿K;￿) is the incumbent￿ s second-period total cost, which depends on its appropria-
tion during that period, q1, ￿rst-period appropriation, x1, the initial stock, ￿K, and the regeneration
rate of the CPR, ￿ 2 [0;1]. On one hand, ￿ < 1 indicates that the regeneration rate of the CPR does
not compensate the reduction of the initial stock (biological regeneration does not o⁄set ￿rst-period
appropriation). In this case, an increase in ￿rst-period appropriation, x1, reduces the amount of
available stock in the second period, increasing as a consequence the incumbent￿ s second-period
marginal costs from appropriation, i.e., c1
q1x1 > 0. On the other hand, ￿ = 1 illustrates that the
regeneration rate exactly compensates the reduction of the initial stock (biological regeneration
o⁄sets ￿rst-period appropriation),5 i.e., c1
q1x1 = 0. Similarly to the ￿rst period, appropriation cost
is increasing and convex, i.e., c1
q1 > 0 and c1
q1q1 > 0. Furthermore, the marginal product of the ￿rst
unit of appropriation is larger than its associated marginal cost, i.e., 1 > c1
q1(0;x1;￿K;￿). Finally,
￿rst-period appropriation increases second-period costs, c1
x1 > 0, at an increasing rate, c1
x1x1 > 0,
where such increase diminishes in the initial stock, i.e., c1
x1￿ < 0.
Second stage, Entry. If entry occurs in the second period, incumbent and entrant compete
for the common resource. Agents￿pro￿ts when competing as duopolists are
DK
i (qi;qj;x1) ￿ qi ￿ zi(qi;qj;x1;￿K;￿) where K = fH;Lg,
for both players i = f1;2g and j 6= i. In particular, when appropriation levels for incumbent and
entrant are q1 and q2, respectively, each player￿ s total cost becomes zi(qi;qj;x1;￿K;￿), allowing for
di⁄erent cost e¢ ciencies between the incumbent and the entrant, since costs functions z1(￿) and z2(￿)
can di⁄er. Distinct e¢ ciencies can arise, for instance, when the incumbent enjoys a technological
advantage from its experience exploiting the commons. Total costs after entry, zi(￿), satisfy the
same properties as c1(￿) indicated above. Additionally, every agent￿ s cost of appropriation, zi (￿),
increases in the other agent￿ s appropriation level, i.e., zi
qj > 0, illustrating agents￿competition for
the CPR. Hence, for a given positive appropriation level, the incumbent￿ s second-period pro￿ts
under monopoly are larger than under duopoly.
3 Complete information
Second stage, No entry. Let us start examining the second period of the game. In the case that
no entry occurs, the incumbent chooses an appropriation level q1 that maximizes its second-period
5We do not consider cases of strong biological regeneration. In particular, this could lead the initial stock to grow
from ￿L to ￿H. In this case, the second-period stock would be high under all parameter conditions, supporting entry








1 (x1;￿K) is the pro￿t-maximizing appropriation level.6 Note that M
K
1 (x1) is decreas-







1 ;x1;￿K;￿), which is negative by de￿nition. Intuitively, the incumbent is negatively af-
fected by its ￿rst-period exploitation of the resource, x1. Indeed, a larger appropriation reduces
the available stock at the beginning of the second period, increasing marginal costs and hence









that the incumbent￿ s equilibrium appropriation level when entry does not occur decreases in its
previous exploitation of the CPR.
Second stage, Entry. In the case that entry occurs, both ￿rms compete in a duopoly. Hence,
for a given equilibrium appropriation level of agent j, qd
j(x1;￿K), agent i 6= j appropriates the level
qi that maximizes its second-period pro￿ts under duopoly
DK





i (x1;￿K) denote the pro￿t-maximizing appropriation level for player i = f1;2g. Therefore,
the entrant decides to enter if its pro￿ts, DK
2 (x1), are weakly higher than those from staying out,
which for simplicity we assume to be zero, i.e., DK























The above expression describes a negative and positive e⁄ect on duopoly pro￿ts. The ￿rst
component illustrates the increase in the incumbent￿ s second-period costs z1 due to a larger ￿rst-
period appropriation, x1, causing a decrease in pro￿ts, i.e., direct e⁄ect. In contrast, the second
component re￿ ects a strategic e⁄ect, since an increase in ￿rst-period appropriation reduces the
available stock at the second period, thus decreasing the entrant￿ s exploitation of the resource, qd
2.
This reduction in the entrant￿ s appropriation produces a decrease in the incumbent￿ s costs, z1,
for a given appropriation level qd
1, increasing the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts as a result. For simplicity,
we assume that the negative (direct) e⁄ect on pro￿ts dominates the positive (strategic) e⁄ect. As
a consequence, a marginal increase in the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation, x1, produces an
overall decrease in its equilibrium pro￿ts when entry ensues, i.e., DK
1 (x1) decreases in x1. Intuitively,
this occurs when the regeneration rate is low enough, inducing @z1
@x1 to be signi￿cantly negative.7 If
6Optimal e⁄ort q
m
1 (x1;￿K) > 0 exists since 1 > c
1
q1(0;x1;￿K;￿) by de￿nition. In addition, it is unique given that
0 ￿ c
1
q1q1 by convexity of the cost function. Existence and uniqueness is also guaranteed for the case of entry.
7Note that if condition (1) were positive, an increase in ￿rst-period appropriation would actually increase the
incumbent￿ s second-period pro￿ts. Since we are mainly interested in analyzing the incumbent￿ s trade-o⁄ between
￿rst and second-period pro￿ts when it increases x1, we only consider the case in which future pro￿ts are negatively
7instead, the CPR totally regenerates across periods (￿ = 1), then second-period costs are una⁄ected
by ￿rst-period appropriation, @z1




@x1 = 0, making DK
1 (x1) constant in x1. A similar analysis can be conducted for
the entrant￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts, DK
2 (x1). To make the entry decision interesting, assume that
0 > DL
2 (x1), re￿ ecting that entry does not occur when the initial stock is low, and DH
2 (x1) > 0,
illustrating that entry ensues when the stock is high for all x1.
First stage, No entry. Given equilibrium appropriation levels in the second stage of the game,
the incumbent chooses the ￿rst-period appropriation x1 that maximizes its ￿rst and second-period
pro￿ts. In particular, if entry does not occur, the incumbent pro￿ts across both periods are x1 ￿
c(x1;￿K)+￿M
K
1 (x1), where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the incumbent￿ s discount factor. Hence, a marginal
increase in its ￿rst-period appropriation x1 produces, on one hand, a marginal bene￿t of MB = 1
from additional appropriation during the ￿rst period (by the envelope theorem). On the other
hand, increasing x1 induces a marginal cost of MCm(x1;￿K) = cx1(x1;￿K) + ￿c1
x1(qm
1 ;x1;￿K;￿)
illustrating the increase in ￿rst- and second-periods costs. Furthermore, assume that the marginal
bene￿t from the ￿rst unit of appropriation is larger than its corresponding marginal cost, i.e.,
MB > MCm(0;￿K) evaluated at x1 = 0. The marginal cost when no entry occurs, MCm(x1;￿K),
is especially relevant for the low-stock incumbent, who anticipates that entry does not occur since
0 > DL
2 (0) > DL









1 denote the solution to the above maximization problem with low stocks, where NE
represents that no entry occurs.8
First stage, Entry. If instead entry occurs, the incumbent faces pro￿ts of x1 ￿ c(x1;￿K) +
￿DK
1 (x1). In this case, an increase in ￿rst period appropriation x1 produces a marginal bene￿t of
MB = 1 which arises from an additional ￿rst-period appropriation. Furthermore, an increase in x1
generates a marginal cost of MCd(x1;￿K) = cx1(x1;￿K) ￿ ￿
dDK
1 (x1)




dx1 indicates the loss in duopoly pro￿ts. We consider that an increase in x1 produces a
signi￿cant increase in ￿rst- and second-period marginal costs, but only a relatively small increase
in the strategic e⁄ect.9 Hence, MCd(x1;￿K) is increasing in x1. In addition, we assume that a
given increase in ￿rst-period appropriation produces a larger increase in second-period cost in the
case of no entry, where the incumbent bears all the negative e⁄ect of ￿rst-period appropriation,
than in the case of entry, where such appropriation a⁄ects both agents, i.e., c1
x1 > z1
x1, which
a⁄ected by ￿rst-period appropriation.
8Existence of x
L;NE
1 is guaranteed since MB > MC
m(0;￿K), where both expressions are evaluated at x1 = 0.
Uniqueness is satis￿ed since a given increase in x1 produces MBx1 = 0 ￿ MC
m
x1 = cx1x1 + ￿c
1
x1x1.
















is positive for all x1, where the
￿rst two components represent the increase in ￿rst- and second-period marginal costs whereas the last two elements
denote the change in the strategic e⁄ect due to higher levels of x1.
8implies MCd(x1;￿K) < MCm(x1;￿K). Similarly, an increase in the initial stock ￿ produces a
larger decrease in the incumbent￿ s costs under no entry, since the incumbent fully bene￿ts from a



















1 denote the solution to (3), where E represents that entry occurs.10 When the stock
totally regenerates across periods, ￿ = 1, ￿rst-period actions do not a⁄ect second-period pro￿ts.








We next evaluate the e¢ ciency properties of our equilibrium results. In this spirit, let us ￿rst
describe the social welfare function for the social planner. In particular, we assume that the
social planner only considers aggregate pro￿ts across both periods. This assumption allows us
to isolate the external e⁄ects that the incumbent￿ s exploitation of the commons imposes on the
potential entrant. We hence focus on those CPRs in which appropriation does not induce signi￿cant
ecological costs associated to the loss of species or biodiversity.11 The social planner thus selects
an aggregate second-period appropriation of12 qm
1 (￿), which yields second-period aggregate pro￿ts
of M
K(x1), for all x1. In the ￿rst period, the social planner chooses x
K;NE
1 , which solves maxx1
MK
1 (x1) + ￿M
K(x1).
Let us now assess the e¢ ciency of our equilibrium results. When no entry occurs, the incumbent
is the only agent exploiting the resource during both periods, and hence it fully internalizes the
e⁄ect that ￿rst-period appropriation causes on its future pro￿ts. Therefore, the resource is exploited
at its socially optimal level, and the ￿tragedy of the commons￿does not apply. The following table
describes our ￿ndings under complete information when ￿ < 1.
10Existence of x
H;E
1 is guaranteed since MB > MC
d(0;￿H) after entry, evaluated at x1 = 0. Uniqueness is satis￿ed
since a given increase in x1 produces MBx1 = 0 ￿ MC
d
x1.
11In addition, the social planner does not consider consumer surplus since the agent/s exploiting the resource sell
a relatively small share of their production in local markets.
12Note that the the social planner can assign the socially optimal appropriation q
m
1 (￿) to a single agent, or instead,
distribute it between the incumbent and the entrant. Furthermore, such appropriation can be equally shared among











Low stock (no entry) 1st Period x
L;NE
1 ; socially optimal
2nd Period qm
1 ; socially optimal






Table I. Equilibrium under complete information.
In contrast, when entry occurs, appropriation levels are not socially optimal. In the second
period, both agents compete for exploiting the CPR, not internalizing the external e⁄ect that their
appropriation levels impose on other players in the form of lower pro￿ts. Hence, the resource
is overexploited, and the ￿tragedy of the commons￿emerges. In the ￿rst period, the high-stock
incumbent￿ s appropriation is not socially optimal either. Speci￿cally, the high-stock incumbent
selects the ￿rst-period appropriation that maximizes its pro￿ts across periods; as indicated in (3).
However, the social planner would select x
H;NE
1 , which lies below the ￿rst-period appropriation se-
lected by the high-stock incumbent in equilibrium, x
H;E
1 . In particular, the social planner considers
the e⁄ect that a marginal increase in x1 imposes on the entrant￿ s equilibrium pro￿ts during the
second period, while the incumbent does not.
Full regeneration. In the particular case in which the stock totally regenerates across periods,
the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation does not impose a negative externality on the entrant￿ s
second-period pro￿ts. As a consequence, the incumbent￿ s appropriation is socially optimal in the
￿rst period, not overexploiting the CPR. Speci￿cally, both incumbent and social planner solve
maxx1 MK
1 (x1) + ￿M
K
1 by selecting x1 = xK
1;monop. During the second period, however, every
agent￿ s appropriation still imposes a negative e⁄ect on the other agent￿ s pro￿ts, and hence aggregate
equilibrium exploitation is beyond the social optimum, re￿ ecting the presence of overexploitation
after entry. Therefore, when ￿ = 1 the ￿rst-period￿ s ine¢ ciency disappears, whereas that of the
second period is still present.
4 Signaling the CPR￿ s stock
This section investigates the case where the incumbent is privately informed about the CPR￿ s initial
stock, while the entrant only observes the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation level using it to
infer the stock￿ s level. The time structure of this signaling game is as follows.
1. Nature decides the realization of the CPR￿ s stock, either high or low, ￿H or ￿L, with prob-
abilities p 2 (0;1) and 1 ￿ p, respectively. The incumbent privately observes this realization
but the entrant does not.
2. The incumbent chooses its ￿rst-period appropriation level, x1.
103. Observing the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation level, the entrant forms beliefs about
the initial stock of the CPR. Let ￿(￿Hjx1) denote the entrant￿ s posterior belief about the
initial stock being high after observing x1.
4. Given the above beliefs, the entrant decides whether or not to enter the CPR.
5. If entry does not occur, the incumbent remains the only agent exploiting the CPR, whereas
if entry occurs, both agents compete for the CPR.
The following subsection examines the separating equilibrium of the game. We then investigate
pooling equilibria and compare our equilibrium results according to their e¢ ciency properties.
4.1 Separating equilibrium
Let us next analyze the separating equilibrium where the incumbent selects a particular ￿rst-period
appropriation level when the stock is high, but chooses a di⁄erent appropriation when the stock is
low. Let xH
1 (xL
1) denote the ￿rst-period appropriation level that the high (low, respectively) stock
incumbent selects in the separating equilibrium. We assume that the separating appropriation level
xL
1 does not coincide with the low-stock incumbent￿ s appropriation under complete information,
x
L;NE
1 . Otherwise, the high-stock incumbent could be tempted to pool with the low-stock incumbent
by selecting13 x
L;NE




1 ) = 1 and ￿(￿HjxL
1) = 0, respectively. The entrant enters when it infers that
the initial stock is high, but stays out when it interprets that the stock is low. First, we investigate
the incentive compatibility conditions that guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium.
When the stock is high, the incumbent selects the appropriation level that maximizes its pro￿ts
across both periods given that entry occurs, i.e., x
H;E
1 arising from the pro￿t maximization problem






1 ). If the high-stock incumbent
deviates towards the low-stock incumbent￿ s appropriation level xL
1, it deters entry. Hence, the































Likewise, if the low-stock incumbent chooses the equilibrium appropriation xL
1, it deters entry,





1). If instead the incumbent deviates towards the high-stock
incumbent￿ s appropriation level, x
H;E











1 that achieves a higher pro￿t than that associated to x
H;E
1 . In particular, the incumbent
13We analyze both players￿incentives to pool using the same ￿rst-period appropriation, including x
L;NE
1 , in the
following section about the pooling equilibrium of the game.
14Incentive compatibility condition ICH also guarantees that the high-stock incumbent does not have incentives




1 ; see proof of Proposition 1.
11selects an appropriation level x
L;E
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The following proposition describes the separating equilibrium.
Proposition 1. The following strategy pro￿le describes the set of separating Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria (PBE) in the CPR signaling game:
1. In the ￿rst period, the high-stock incumbent selects x
H;E




1 ], where xA
1 and xB
1 solve the incentive compatibility condition for the low and high-




2. The entrant enters only after observing an appropriation level of x
H;E
1 , given equilibrium
beliefs ￿(￿Hjx
H;E
1 ) = 1 and ￿(￿HjxL
1) = 0 for any xL
1 2 [xA
1 ;xB
1 ], and o⁄-the-equilibrium




3. In the second period of the game, the incumbent selects an appropriation qm
1 (x1;￿K) if entry
does not occur, and every agent i = f1;2g chooses qd
i (x1;￿K) if entry occurs.
Figure 1. Separating equilibria under ￿ < 1.
12The ￿gure above depicts the set of separating equilibria where the high-stock incumbent selects
a ￿rst-period appropriation x
H;E
1 , which coincides with its appropriation level under complete




1 ], which is strictly below its appropriation level in the complete information context.
Speci￿cally, the low-stock incumbent reduces its ￿rst-period appropriation level, relative to
complete information, in order to convey its private information to the entrant, deterring it from










represents the incumbent￿ s entry de-
terrence bene￿ts. Speci￿cally, since M
K
1 (xL
1) is decreasing in xL











is also decreasing and convex in xL






1) depicts the incumbent￿ s loss in ￿rst-period pro￿ts from selecting appro-
priation levels away from that maximizing pro￿ts across both periods given entry, x
K;E








1 ) < MK
1 (xK
1;monop),
as represented in the negative region of the ￿gure.
The following corollary examines the particular case in which the CPR is totally regenerated















where second-period pro￿ts are una⁄ected by ￿rst-period appropriation, both under entry and no
entry. As a consequence, the ￿rst-period pro￿t-maximizing appropriation level when entry occurs
becomes xH
1;monop rather than x
H;E















Corollary 1. The following strategy pro￿le describes the set of separating PBE in the CPR
signaling game when ￿ = 1:
1. In the ￿rst period, the high-stock incumbent selects xH
1;monop and the low-stock chooses xL
1 2
[e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ], where e xA
1 and e xB
1 solve the incentive compatibility condition for the low and high-
stock incumbent, respectively, and xL
1 < xL
1;monop;
2. The entrant enters only after observing an appropriation level of xH
1;monop in the ￿rst period,
given equilibrium beliefs ￿(￿HjxH
1;monop) = 1 and ￿(￿HjxL
1) = 0 for any xL
1 2 [e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ], and
o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs ￿(￿Hjx1) = 1 for all x1 6= xH
1;monop 6= xL
1; and


















































133. In the second period of the game, the incumbent selects an appropriation qm
1 (￿K) if entry does
not occur, and every agent i = f1;2g chooses qd
i (￿K) if entry occurs.
The total regeneration of the initial stock makes second-period pro￿ts independent on ￿rst-
period appropriation. As a consequence, second-period equilibrium appropriation levels, qm
1 (￿K)
and qd
i (￿K), are also independent on the previous exploitation of the resource. Therefore, the
high-stock incumbent selects a ￿rst-period appropriation xH
1;monop, which maximizes its ￿rst-period
monopoly pro￿ts given that second-period pro￿ts are una⁄ected by previous exploitation. This
appropriation level coincides with the high-stock incumbent￿ s appropriation under complete in-
formation and ￿ = 1. The low-stock incumbent chooses an appropriation level in the interval
xL
1 2 [e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ], which is lower than the ￿rst-period appropriation that this incumbent selects under
complete information, xL
1;monop. Similarly to the case under ￿ < 1, the low-stock incumbent reduces
its ￿rst-period appropriation in order to communicate the low initial stock to the potential entrant,
deterring entry as a result. The following ￿gure illustrates the set of separating equilibria for ￿ = 1.
Figure 2. Separating equilibria under ￿ = 1.
First, note that the incumbent￿ s bene￿t from maintaining its monopolistic power is una⁄ected
by its ￿rst-period appropriation xL
1 when ￿ = 1, but it becomes decreasing when ￿ < 1. This







in ￿gure 2￿ is constant in xL
1, but the equivalent bene￿t










, becomes decreasing in xL
1 (see ￿gure 1). Intuitively, an
14increase in ￿rst-period appropriation does not a⁄ect the incumbent￿ s second-period pro￿ts when
￿ = 1, since the CPR fully regenerates, both after entry and no entry. However, a lower regeneration
rate (￿ < 1) reduces second-period monopoly pro￿ts, since fewer stock is available for exploitation,
ultimately reducing the incumbent￿ s bene￿t from protecting its monopolistic position. In addition,




1 ) in ￿gure 2 experiences a downward shift when ￿ < 1 (see
equivalent curve in ￿gure 1). Intuitively, the incumbent is willing to give up ￿rst-period pro￿ts in
order to preserve the future pro￿tability of the resource.
Before comparing the set of separating equilibria under di⁄erent regeneration rates, let us apply
the Cho and Kreps￿[24] Intuitive Criterion in order to eliminate any ￿unreasonable￿separating
equilibria.




1 ) violate the Cho and Kreps￿Intuitive Criterion. The least-costly separating
equilibrium whereby the low-stock incumbent chooses xL
1 = xB
1 survives the Intuitive Criterion if





2 (x1). Similarly, all separating PBE described in Corollary 1
in which the low-stock incumbent selects xL
1 2 [e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ) violate the Intuitive Criterion. The least-
costly separating equilibrium where the low-stock incumbent chooses xL
1 = e xB
1 survives the Intuitive
Criterion if p > p.
Hence, the low-stock incumbent can signal its type by appropriating the highest possible level
xB




when ￿ < 1 or those in xL
1 2 [e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ) when ￿ = 1) would never be selected by the low-stock
incumbent. Indeed, starting from an appropriation xA
1 , any higher level also deters entry, and
increases the low-stock incumbent￿ s pro￿ts. This argument can be repeated for all appropriation
levels higher than xA
1 , inducing the incumbent to raise its ￿rst-period appropriation until xB
1 , since
it still signals a low stock and thus deters entry.16 A similar argument holds for the case in which
the commons totally regenerate across periods, ￿ = 1, whereby the low-stock incumbent selects the
highest appropriation inducing separation, e xB
1 .
Let us next analyze how incomplete information a⁄ects ￿rst-period appropriation for the low-
stock incumbent.17 In particular, when the initial stock totally regenerates across periods, the low-
stock incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation under complete information, xL
1;monop, is higher than
the least-costly appropriation that deters entry, e xB
1 . Intuitively, the entrant￿ s lack of information
about the available stock induces the incumbent to give up ￿rst-period pro￿ts (extracting a lower
16Note that if the low-stock incumbent deviates towards a ￿rst-period appropriation x
L





the high-stock incumbent might have incentives to deviate from the equilibrium appropriation of x
H;E
1 and pool with
the low-stock incumbent when such deviation deters entry. This occurs when the prior probability of the stock being
high is su¢ ciently small, i.e., p < p(x1); as we explain in the next section about the pooling equilibrium. Otherwise,
the high-stock incumbent does not deviate from x
H;E
1 and the low-stock incumbent deters entry by selecting the
least-costly separating appropriation level x
B
1 .
17The high-stock incumbent￿ s appropriation in the ￿rst period of the game, x
H;E
1 , coincides with that under
complete information. For this reason, we focus on the low-stock incumbent.
15appropriation level) in order to deter entry. When the stock does not regenerate across time,




1 in the signaling game. A similar intuition as above applies to this case. Therefore,
the presence of incomplete information serves as a tool to promote the incumbent￿ s own conservation
of the CPR when the initial stock is relatively low. In addition, if the regeneration rate of the
resource is low, entry deterrence bene￿ts sharply decrease in ￿rst-period appropriation, xL
1, inducing
a small conservation e⁄ort by the incumbent, x
L;NE
1 ￿xB
1 . In this case, the conservation e⁄ort under
full regeneration, xL
1;monop ￿ e xB
1 , is larger than under partial regeneration. That is, the low-stock
incumbent underexploits the resource more when the stock fully regenerates in order to convey the
characteristics of the CPR to the entrant than when the regeneration rate is low. For simplicity,
we thereafter focus on this case.
E¢ ciency properties. Let us next evaluate the e¢ ciency properties of the separating equi-
librium. When the initial stock is high, the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation coincides with
that under complete information. As shown in the previous section, this appropriation level is
not socially optimal, since the incumbent does not internalize the future negative e⁄ect that an
increase in ￿rst-period appropriation has on the entrant￿ s pro￿ts. Therefore, the high-stock in-
cumbent overexploits the CPR both under complete and incomplete information. When the initial
stock is low, we just demonstrated that the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period appropriation lies below that
under complete information. Since the low-stock incumbent￿ s appropriation under complete infor-
mation coincides with the socially optimal level, the introduction of incomplete information leads
to an underexploitation of the CPR. Thus, incomplete information raises two forms of ine¢ ciency:
the high-stock￿ s incumbent￿ s overexploitation of the CPR (that arises under both informational
contexts) and the underexploitation of the resource by the low-stock incumbent. The following
table summarizes our results.
Separating PBE Complete Information
Low stock 1st Period xB
1 ; underexploitation x
L;NE
1 ; socially optimal
2nd Period qm
1 ; socially optimal qm
1 ; socially optimal
High stock 1st Period x
H;E








Table II. Separating equilibrium.
Full regeneration. In the particular case in which the resource totally regenerates across
periods, ￿ = 1, the ￿rst type of ine¢ ciency is absent, as suggested in our discussion of the model
under complete information. The second type of ine¢ ciency, however, does not disappear but
instead, becomes larger as the stock totally regenerates. In particular, the underexploitation of
the low-stock CPR is more signi￿cant when the resource fully regenerates across time than when
it does not. Our result would recommend no need of government intervention when asymmetric
information is present, since the low-stock incumbent already has incentives to conserve the CPR.
16Note that this incumbent would actually favor a regulation that prescribes socially optimal ap-
propriation levels across periods. Speci￿cally, socially optimal levels for the low-stock incumbent
coincide with equilibrium appropriation under complete information, which are higher than those
in the separating equilibrium and yield higher pro￿ts. Hence, under such regulation the low-stock
incumbent would not need to reduce ￿rst-period appropriation in order to deter entry, yielding
higher pro￿ts than under the threat of entry.18
4.2 Pooling equilibrium
Let us now examine the pooling equilibrium of the game, where both types of incumbent select the
same ￿rst-period appropriation level.
Proposition 3. The following strategy pro￿le describes a pooling PBE in the CPR signaling
game that survives the Cho and Kreps￿Intuitive Criterion:
1. In the ￿rst period, both incumbents select the same ￿rst-period appropriation x
L;NE
1 ;
2. The entrant does not enter after observing the equilibrium appropriation x
L;NE
1 , but enters
after observing any o⁄-the-equilibrium appropriation x0
1, given beliefs ￿(￿Hjx
L;NE
1 ) = p <
p(x
L;NE
1 ) and ￿(￿Hjx0
1) = 1; and
3. In the second period of the game, the incumbent selects qm
1 (x1;￿K) if entry does not occur,
and every agent i = f1;2g chooses qd
i (x1;￿K) if entry occurs.
Therefore, in the pooling equilibrium both types of incumbent selects the same ￿rst-period
appropriation, which reveals no additional information about the initial stock to the entrant, deter-
ring entry. This is a positive result in terms of overexploitation since entry does not occur; unlike
the complete information context when the initial stock is high, leading to overexploitation during
the second period. Note that incomplete information provides the high-stock incumbent with an
￿implicit protection right,￿since it helps the incumbent protect the resource from entry.
Let us next evaluate the e¢ ciency properties of the pooling equilibrium. First, in the case of
no entry, ￿rst-period socially optimal appropriation is x
K;NE
1 , as described in section 3.1. Hence,
both types of incumbent (weakly) underexploit the resource during the ￿rst period. Speci￿cally,




1 , whereas the low-
stock incumbent selects the socially optimal appropriation level x
L;NE
1 . In contrast, in the second
period both types of incumbent choose socially optimal levels given that no entry occurs. A similar
intuition applies to the case in which the resource totally regenerates across periods, ￿ = 1, where
both types of incumbent select xL
1;monop.
18The regulator could, instead, prescribe a distribution of the second-period socially optimal appropriation levels
between the incumbent and the entrant. In such case, the low-stock incumbent￿ s pro￿ts are not necessarily higher
than those under the threat of entry.
174.3 E¢ ciency comparison
The following table compares the e¢ ciency properties of the separating and pooling equilibria when
￿ < 1.
Separating PBE Pooling PBE
Low stock 1st Period xB
1 ; underexploitation x
L;NE
1 ; socially optimal
2nd Period qm
1 ; socially optimal qm
1 ; socially optimal
High stock 1st Period x
H;E






1 ; socially optimal
Table III. E¢ ciency properties in the separating and pooling equilibria.
When the initial stock is high, the pooling equilibrium induces the incumbent to conserve
the commons by underexploiting it during the ￿rst period and by selecting the socially optimal
appropriation level in the second period. In contrast, in the separating equilibrium the CPR is
overexploited along both periods. Therefore when the CPR￿ s stock is high, our results do not
prescribe a precise policy recommendation. If, however, social preferences assign a greater welfare
loss to overexploitation than to underexploitation, then environmental agencies holding private
information about the commons￿stock being high should promote parameter conditions under which
the pooling equilibrium emerges. In particular, the regulator can promote the pooling equilibrium
by setting a ￿rst-period quota that speci￿es signi￿cant penalties for those incumbents exceeding
x
L;NE
1 . Intuitively, these penalties make the separating equilibrium appropriation less attractive
for the high-stock incumbent.
5 Conclusions
We examine the exploitation of a common pool resource (CPR) under complete and incomplete in-
formation, and investigate how the presence of incomplete information can lead to di⁄erent degrees
of conservation. In particular, we show that the lack of information about the initial stock promotes
the preservation of the resource when its initial stock is low, relative to complete information. This
conservation of the CPR is especially signi￿cant when the commons fully regenerate across periods.
Under complete information we demonstrate that only one type of ine¢ ciency arises, due to the
overexploitation of the CPR by the high-stock incumbent both in the ￿rst and second period of
the game. However, under incomplete information an additional type of ine¢ ciency exists, due
to the underexploitation of the CPR by the low-stock incumbent in the separating equilibrium.
Speci￿cally, this type of incumbent uses underexploitation as a tool to signal a low available stock
to potential entrants, who are thus deterred from entering. This last form of ine¢ ciency might be
observed in di⁄erent CPRs where the entrant is uninformed about the available initial stock of the
resource.
18In the pooling equilibrium the overexploitation of the CPR in the second period is absent
but the high-stock incumbent underexploits the resource in the ￿rst period. Hence, appropriation
levels in the pooling equilibrium coincide with the social optimum when the initial stock is low.
The high-stock incumbent￿ s overexploitation observed in the separating equilibrium during the
second period disappears in the pooling equilibrium, whereas its overexploitation in the ￿rst period
reverts to underexploitation, suggesting that environmental agencies should promote the pooling
equilibrium. Thus, the tragedy of the commons ￿ present in the separating equilibrium￿dissipates
in the pooling equilibrium when the initial stock is high.
This paper considers a single entrant in a two-period model. If, instead, multiple entrants
sequentially choose whether to enter the commons, our separating equilibrium still applies. In
particular, the low-stock incumbent deters entry in the ￿rst period, and selects its monopoly ap-
propriation level in the second period, which reveals the state of the stock to potential entrants,
further deterring entry. The high-stock incumbent attracts entry, and chooses its duopoly appro-
priation in the second period, which also conveys information to future entrants, attracting entry.
In the pooling equilibrium, however, our model predicts that the high-stock incumbent selects its
second-period monopoly appropriation level, which might not be sensible if entry is still possible
in future periods. Indeed, this incumbent chooses a monopoly exploitation level when no future
entry exists, but could choose a di⁄erent appropriation level in order to keep potential entrants
uninformed about the stock. Another venue of potential research considers the presence of more
than one incumbent in a context of complete information, as in Gilbert and Vives [25], and how
an increase in the number of incumbents a⁄ects the ￿rst-period overexploitation of the resource.
The introduction of multiple incumbents in an incomplete information setting, however, facilitates
the entrant￿ s access to more accurate information about the available stock, hampering the role
of appropriation as a signaling device. Finally, it could be interesting to study policy instruments
that reduce the extent of the two types of ine¢ ciencies identi￿ed in this paper.
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1 Appendix 1 - Single crossing property
In the following lemma we describe under which conditions the single-crossing property holds. Let
second-period equilibrium costs be denoted by zi(x1;￿K) and c1(x1;￿K) after entry and no entry,
respectively.
Lemma A. When entry does not occur, incumbent￿ s pro￿ts satisfy the single-crossing property












Intuitively, the incumbent￿ s payo⁄structure satis￿es the single-crossing property if an additional
unit of ￿rst-period appropriation x1 produces a larger strategic e⁄ect when the stock is low than
when it is high.
Proof. If entry does not occur, the high-stock incumbent￿ s pro￿ts are MH
1 (x1)+￿M
H
1 (x1), for a
given ￿rst-period appropriation x1, and for a given appropriation level qm
1 (x1;￿H) that maximizes
pro￿ts in the second period of the game. If the high-stock incumbent marginally increases ￿rst
period appropriation, it experiences an increase in pro￿ts of 1 ￿ cx1(x1;￿H) ￿ ￿c1
x1(x1;￿H), where
c1(x1;￿H) denotes the high-stock incumbent￿ s second-period cost, given that no entry occurs and
that the incumbent selects the monopoly pro￿t-maximizing appropriation in the second period.
The previous derivative can be alternatively expressed as MB ￿ MCm (x1;￿H). Similarly for
the low-stock incumbent. Hence, under no entry, the single-crossing property holds if MB ￿
￿Address: 111C Hulbert Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164. E-mail: anaespinola@wsu.edu.
yAddress: 103G Hulbert Hall, Washington State University. Pullman, WA 99164-6210. E-mail: fmunoz@wsu.edu.
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1MCm (x1;￿H) ￿ MB ￿ MCm (x1;￿L), or alternatively, if MCm(x1;￿H) ￿ MCm(x1;￿L), i.e.,








< cx1(x1;￿L) ￿ cx1(x1;￿H)
where the right-hand side is positive since ￿rst-period costs satisfy cx1￿ < 0 by de￿nition. In
addition, the left-hand side is negative since second-period costs satisfy c1
x1￿ < 0 by de￿nition.
Hence, the single-crossing property holds under all parameter values if no entry follows.
If entry occurs, the high-stock incumbent￿ s pro￿ts are MH
1 (x1)+￿DH
1 (x1), for a given ￿rst-period
appropriation x1, and for a given appropriation level qd
1(x1;￿H) that maximizes pro￿ts in the second
period of the game. If the high-stock incumbent marginally increases ￿rst-period appropriation, it











previous condition can be alternatively expressed as MB￿MCd(x1;￿H). Similarly for the low-stock
incumbent. Hence, under entry, the single-crossing property is satis￿ed if MB ￿ MCd (x1;￿H) ￿
MB￿MCd (x1;￿L), or alternatively, if MCd(x1;￿H) ￿ MCd(x1;￿L), i.e., the incumbent￿ s marginal














































< cx1(x1;￿L) ￿ cx1(x1;￿H)
where the right-hand side of the inequality is positive since ￿rst-period costs satisfy cx1￿ < 0 by
de￿nition. Furthermore, the ￿rst term in the left-hand side is negative since z1
x1￿ < 0 by de￿nition.













































































. For compactness, let M1(x1;￿) de-
note monopoly second-period equilibrium pro￿ts as a function of ￿rst-period appropriation, x1,
2and the initial stock, ￿. Similarly, let D1(xE
1 (￿);￿) represent duopoly second-period equilibrium
pro￿ts as a function of the ￿rst-period equilibrium appropriation that maximizes the incumbent￿ s
pro￿ts given that entry follows, xE
1 (￿), for a given initial stock ￿. We next show that the di⁄erence
M1(x1;￿)￿D1(xE
1 (￿);￿) is increasing in ￿. In particular, di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ and using

































￿ and the second and third term are positive by
de￿nition.
























denotes the incumbent￿ s second-period cost, given that no entry occurs and that the incumbent se-
lects the appropriation level qm





















, guaranteeing that the former
does not cross the latter. ￿
3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that entrant beliefs become ￿(￿HjxH
1 ) = 1 after observing the equilibrium appropriation
level xH
1 and ￿(￿HjxL
1) = 0 after observing the equilibrium level xL
1 for any xL
1 2 [xA
1 ;xB
1 ]. If the
entrant observes an o⁄-the-equilibrium appropriation level of x1 6= xH
1 6= xL
1, then Bayes￿rule does
not specify a particular posterior o⁄-the-equilibrium belief, i.e., ￿(￿Hjx1) 2 [0;1], and for simplicity




1 ) > 0, but stays out after observing an appropriation of xL
1 given that
0 > DL
2 (0) > DL
2 (xL
1). After observing an o⁄-the-equilibrium level x1 6= xH
1 6= xL
1, the entrant
enters if and only if its expected pro￿ts from entering satisfy
￿(￿Hjx1) ￿ DH
2 (x1) + (1 ￿ ￿(￿Hjx1))DL








2 (x1) > 0, implying DH
2 (x1) ￿ DL
2 (x1) > ￿DL
2 (x1), and since both sides of the inequality
are positive, we can conclude that ￿(x1) 2 (0;1). In this case, the entrant enters if its o⁄-the-
equilibrium beliefs ￿(￿Hjx1) satisfy ￿(￿Hjx1) > ￿(x1), which holds since ￿(￿Hjx1) = 1.
Let us now examine the high-stock incumbent￿ s incentives. By selecting the equilibrium appro-
priation level x
H;E










1 (x1) + ￿DH
1 (x1). Second, ￿rst-period appropriation x
H;E
1 coincides with
the equilibrium level that the high-stock incumbent selects under complete information, yielding the
same pro￿ts. By deviating towards the low-stock incumbent￿ s equilibrium appropriation, xL
1, the





1). Hence, the high-stock
3incumbent prefers to select an equilibrium ￿rst-period appropriation of x
H;E





1 ) + ￿DH
1 (x
H;E


























1 then entry follows, yielding pro￿ts of MH
1 (x1) + ￿DH















1). By deviating towards the high-stock incumbent￿ s equilibrium
appropriation level, x
H;E







1 ). Therefore, the low-stock incumbent selects an equilibrium ￿rst-period appropriation
level of xL















If instead the low-stock incumbent deviates towards any o⁄-the-equilibrium level x1 6= xH
1;monop 6=
xL
1 then entry follows, and therefore the incumbent selects the value of x1 that maximizes ML
1 (x1)+
￿DL
1 (x1). Let x
L;E







1 ). Hence, the low-stock incumbent chooses its equilibrium appropriation level of xL
1 rather















Note that condition A.2 implies A.1 since ML
1 (x
L;E
1 ) + ￿DL
1 (x
L;E
1 ) > ML
1 (x
H;E






1 maximizes the low-stock incumbent￿ s pro￿ts (across both periods) given entry,
whereas x
H;E
1 does not. Therefore, condition A.2 becomes the incentive compatibility condition
that must be satis￿ed in order to guarantee that the low-stock incumbent does not deviate from
its equilibrium level of xL

















4 Proof of Corollary 1
In this case the CPR totally regenerates, ￿ = 1. First, entrant beliefs become ￿(￿HjxH
1;monop) = 1
after observing the equilibrium appropriation level of xH
1;monop and ￿(￿HjxL
1) = 0 after observing
the equilibrium level of xL
1 for any xL
1 2 [e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ]. If the entrant observes an o⁄-the-equilibrium level
of x1 6= xH
1;monop 6= xL
1, then Bayes￿rule does not specify a particular posterior o⁄-the-equilibrium
belief, i.e., ￿(￿Hjx1) 2 [0;1], and for simplicity we take ￿(￿Hjx1) = 1. Given these beliefs, the
entrant enters after observing an appropriation level of xH
1;monop since DH
2 (0) ￿ DH
2 > 0, but stays
out after observing an appropriation of xL
1 given that DL
2 (0) ￿ DL
2 < 0. After observing an o⁄-
4the-equilibrium level x1 6= xH
1;monop 6= xL
1, the entrant enters if and only if its expected pro￿ts from






￿ ￿, which holds as shown in Proposition 1.
Let us now examine the high-stock incumbent￿ s incentives. By selecting the equilibrium ap-
propriation level of xH






1;monop) represents the highest monopoly pro￿t that the high-stock incumbent can
obtain during the ￿rst period, and where second-period pro￿ts are independent on x1 since the
resource is totally regenerated (￿ = 1). Note that xH
1;monop coincides with the ￿rst-period ap-
propriation level that the high-stock incumbent selects in the complete information context. By
deviating towards the low-stock incumbent￿ s equilibrium appropriation, xL
1, the high-stock incum-




1 . Hence, the high-stock incumbent prefers
an equilibrium ￿rst-period appropriation level of xH






















Note that if the high-stock incumbent deviates towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium level of x1 6=
xH
1;monop 6= xL
1, entry follows, yielding pro￿ts of MH
1 (x1) + ￿DH




1 given that xH
1;monop is the pro￿t-maximizing appropriation level
under monopoly.
Let us now analyze the low-stock incumbent. Selecting the equilibrium ￿rst-period appropria-





1. By deviating towards the high-stock incumbent￿ s equilib-
rium appropriation level, xH




1 . Therefore, the low-stock incumbent selects an equilibrium ￿rst-period
appropriation level of xL










If instead the low-stock incumbent deviates towards any o⁄-the-equilibrium level x1 6= xH
1;monop 6=
xL




1 (x1) + ￿DL
1 subject to x1 6= xH
1;monop 6= xL
1
But note that this maximization problem is equivalent to max
x1
ML
1 (x1), with solution given by the





1 . Hence, the low-stock incumbent chooses its equilibrium appropriation level
of xL





















1;monop). Therefore, condition A.5 becomes the incentive compatibility con-
dition that must be satis￿ed in order to guarantee that the low-stock incumbent does not deviate
from its equilibrium appropriation of xL




























from ICL are both independent
on xL
1. We next investigate the conditions under which the former cuto⁄ is above the latter. For
compactness, let M1(￿) and D1(￿) denote monopoly and duopoly second-period equilibrium pro￿ts
as a function of the initial stock, ￿. Hence, we want to show that the di⁄erence M1(￿) ￿ D1(￿) is







































5 Proof of Proposition 2
Case in which ￿ < 1. Suppose that the low-stock incumbent appropriates xL
1 = xA
1 . Let us ￿rst
check if a deviation towards x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ] is equilibrium dominated for either type of incumbent.
On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the high-stock incumbent can obtain deviating towards
x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ] occurs when entry does not ensue. In such case, the high-stock incumbent obtains
MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1). Hence, it deviates only if MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1) > MH
1 (x
H;E




But ICH guarantees that this inequality cannot hold for any x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ]. Hence the high-stock
incumbent does not have incentives to deviate from x
H;E
1 to x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ].
On the other hand, the highest pro￿t that the low-stock incumbent can obtain from deviating
towards x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ] occurs when entry does not ensue. In such case, the low-stock incumbent￿ s
payo⁄ is ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1(x1) which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t of ML
1 (xA










1(x1) reaches its maximum at x
L;NE
1 . Therefore, the low-stock
incumbent has incentives to deviate from xA
1 to x1.
Hence, after observing a ￿rst-period appropriation of x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ], the entrant concentrates
its posterior beliefs on the initial stock being low, i.e., ￿(￿Hjx1) = 0, and does not enter. Given
this updated o⁄-the equilibrium beliefs, the low-stock incumbent appropriates x1 and deters entry,
yielding payo⁄ ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1(x1), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t from appropriating xA
1 .
Thus, the low-stock incumbent deviates from xA
1 , and the separating equilibrium in which it selects
xA
1 violates the Intuitive Criterion. A similar argument is applicable to all separating equilibria
in which the low-stock incumbent selects x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 ), all of them also violating the Intuitive
Criterion.
6Finally, let us check that the separating equilibrium in which the low-stock incumbent chooses
xL
1 = xB
1 survives the Intuitive Criterion. If the low-stock incumbent deviates towards x1 2 (xA
1 ;xB
1 )
the highest pro￿t that it can obtain is ML
1 (x1)+￿M
L
1(x1), which is lower than its equilibrium payo⁄
of ML
1 (xB
1 ) + ￿M
L
1(xB
1 ). If, instead, it deviates towards x1 > xB








the low-stock incumbent has incentives to deviate. Let us now check if the high-stock incumbent
also has incentives to deviate towards x1 2 (xB
1 ;x
L;NE
1 ]. The highest pro￿t that it can obtain is
MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts if MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H





















which is satis￿ed for all x1 > xB
1 (see ￿gure 1). Hence, the high-stock incumbent also has incentives
to deviate towards x1 2 (xB
1 ;x
L;NE
1 ]. This implies that, after observing a deviation x1, the entrant
cannot update his prior beliefs, and chooses to enter if the expected pro￿t from entering satis￿es
pDH
2 (x1) + (1 ￿ p)DL









2 (x1) > 0, implying that DH
2 (x1) ￿ DL
2 (x1) > ￿DL
2 (x1), and since both sides of the
inequality are positive, then p(x1) > 0. Hence, if p > p(x1), entry occurs, yielding pro￿ts ML
1 (x1)+
￿DL























1 ) ￿ ML
1 (x1)+￿DL
1 (x1) given that x
L;E
1 is the argmax of ML
1 (x1)+
￿DL
1 (x1), then ML
1 (xB
1 ) + ￿M
L
1(xB
1 ) ￿ ML
1 (x1) + ￿DL
1 (x1) for any deviation x1, and therefore the
low-stock incumbent does not deviate. Regarding the high-stock incumbent, it obtains pro￿ts of
MH
1 (x1) + ￿DH







1 ) since x
H;E
1 is the argmax of MH
1 (x1)+￿DH
1 (x1). Hence, the high-stock incumbent does
not deviate towards x1 either, and the separating equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion if
p > p(x1).
If p < p(x1), then entry does not occur, yielding pro￿ts of ML
1 (x1)+￿M
L
1(x1) for the low-stock









the separating equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion if p < p(x1).
Case in which ￿ = 1. Suppose that the low-stock incumbent appropriates xL
1 = e xA
1 . Let
us ￿rst check if a deviation towards x1 2 (e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ] is equilibrium dominated for either type of
incumbent.
On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the high-stock incumbent can obtain deviating towards
x1 2 (e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ] occurs when entry does not ensue. In such case, the high-stock incumbent obtains
MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H









1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 for all x1 2 [e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ]
7Hence, the high-stock incumbent does not have incentives to deviate. On the other hand, the highest
pro￿t that the low-stock incumbent can obtain from deviating towards x1 2 (e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ] occurs when




its equilibrium pro￿t of ML
1 (e xA
1 ) + ￿M
L
1 since x1 > e xA
1 . Therefore, the low-stock incumbent has
incentives to deviate from e xA
1 to x1.
Hence, after observing a ￿rst period appropriation of x1 2 (e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ], the entrant concentrates
its posterior beliefs on the initial stock being low, i.e., ￿(￿Hjx1) = 0, and does not enter. Given
this updated o⁄-the equilibrium beliefs, the low-stock incumbent appropriates x1 and deters entry,
yielding payo⁄ ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1, which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t from appropriating e xA
1 . Thus,
the low-stock incumbent deviates from e xA
1 , and the separating equilibrium in which it selects
e xA
1 violates the Intuitive Criterion. A similar argument is applicable for all separating equilibria
in which the low-stock incumbent selects x1 2 (e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ), all of them also violating the Intuitive
Criterion.
Finally, let us check that the separating equilibrium in which the low-stock incumbent chooses
e xB
1 survives the Intuitive Criterion. If the low-stock incumbent deviates towards x1 2 (e xA
1 ; e xB
1 ) the
highest pro￿t that it can obtain is ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1, which is lower than its equilibrium payo⁄ of
ML
1 (e xB
1 ) + ￿M
L
1. If, instead, it deviates towards x1 > e xB
1 , the highest payo⁄ that it can obtain
is ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1, which exceeds its equilibrium payo⁄ for all x1 2 (xB
1 ;xL
1;monop]. Hence, the
low-stock incumbent has incentives to deviate. Let us now check if the high-stock incumbent also
has incentives to deviate towards x1 2 (xB
1 ;xL
1;monop]. The highest pro￿t that it can obtain is
MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 , which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts if MH
















1 (x1), which is satis￿ed for
all x1 > e xB
1 (see ￿gure 2). Hence, the high-stock incumbent also has incentives to deviate towards
x1 2 (e xB
1 ;xL
1;monop]. This implies that, after observing a deviation x1, the entrant cannot update its












2 > 0, implying that DH
2 ￿ DL
2 > ￿DL
2 , and since both sides of the inequality are
positive, then p > 0. Hence, if p > p, entry occurs, yielding pro￿ts of ML
1 (x1) + ￿DL
1 for the


















1 given that xL





1 ) + ￿M
L
1 ￿ ML
1 (x1) + ￿DL
1 and therefore the low-stock incumbent does not deviate.
Regarding the high-stock incumbent, it obtains pro￿ts of MH
1 (x1) + ￿DH
1 by deviating towards




1;monop is the argmax
of MH
1 (x1) + ￿DH
1 . Hence, the high-stock incumbent does not deviate towards x1 either, and the
separating equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion if p > p.
If p < p, then entry does not occur, yielding pro￿ts of ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1 for the low-stock in-
8cumbent, which exceed its equilibrium pro￿ts ML
1 (e xB
1 ) + ￿M
L
1 since x1 2 (e xB
1 ;xL
1;monop]. Then the
separating equilibrium violates the Intuitive Criterion if p < p. ￿
6 Proof of Proposition 3
In a pooling strategy pro￿le where both types of incumbent select x1, equilibrium beliefs are
￿(￿Hjx1) = p and ￿(￿Ljx1) = 1 ￿ p, which coincide with the prior probability distribution over
types. In addition, o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs cannot be identi￿ed using Bayes￿rule, and for simplic-
ity let us assume that, after observing x0
1 6= x1, ￿(￿Hjx0
1) = 1. As shown in the proof of Proposition
1, these beliefs induce the entrant to enter after observing x0
1. Otherwise the entrant stays out. On
the other hand, after observing x1, the entrant enters if and only if pDH
2 (x1) + (1 ￿ p)DL










2 (x1) > 0, implying that DH
2 (x1) ￿ DL
2 (x1) > ￿DL
2 (x1), and since both sides of the
inequality are positive, we can conclude that the entrant enters if p > p(x1), and stays out otherwise.
Note that if entry occurs after x1, this induces every type of incumbent to select x
K;E





1 this strategy pro￿le cannot be a pooling equilibrium. Hence, it must be that p < p(x1)
inducing the entrant to stay out. Let us start by checking under which conditions the high-stock




By deviating towards x0







1 . Hence, the high-stock incumbent does not deviate from x1 if,
MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1) ￿ MH
1 (x
H;E








1 ) ￿ MH














1 ) ￿ ML










Hence, any x1 simultaneously satisfying ICH and ICL constitutes a pooling equilibrium ￿rst-
period appropriation of the signaling game.
Intuitive Criterion. Case 1. Let us analyze if the pooling ￿rst-period appropriation x1 =
x
L;NE
1 survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. We ￿rst check if such appropri-
ation level is equilibrium dominated for either type of incumbent. On one hand, the low-stock



























its maximum at exactly x0
1 = x
L;NE
1 . Hence, the low-stock incumbent does not have incen-
tives to deviate from the pooling appropriation level x1 = x
L;NE
1 . On the other hand, the















1 the highest payo⁄ that it obtains occurs when entry is deterred,





1). Therefore, the high-stock incumbent does not have in-




























1 ], i.e., ￿(￿Hjx0
1) = 1, whereas its updated beliefs are una⁄ected after





1 ], the entrant believes that
such deviation can only come from a high-stock incumbent and enters. The high-stock incumbent￿ s



























1), are maximal at x0
1 = x
H;E































































































This condition is hence satis￿ed since x
L;NE
1 > xB
1 . Therefore, the high-stock incumbent does not
have incentives to deviate either, and the pooling PBE in which x1 = x
L;NE
1 survives the Intuitive
Criterion.
Case 2. Let us next check if the pooling ￿rst-period appropriation level x1 > x
L;NE
1 survives
the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. On one hand, the low-stock incumbent obtains
ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1(x1) in equilibrium. By instead deviating towards x0
1 6= x1, the highest pro￿t that





1), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t of ML











1) function with respect to x0
1.
On the other hand, the high-stock incumbent obtains MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1) in equilibrium. By
instead deviating towards x0






which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t of MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1) if x0
1 2 (x
H;NE
1 ;x1). Hence, beliefs
can be restricted to ￿(￿Hjx0






entrant￿ s beliefs are una⁄ected, since either both types of incumbent have incentives to deviate or





1 ), the entrant believes
that the stock must be low, and chooses not to enter. Under these updated beliefs, the low-stock






1 ). Therefore, the pooling PBE where x1 > x
L;NE
1 violates the Intuitive
Criterion.
Case 3. Let us ￿nally check if the pooling ￿rst-period appropriation level x1 < x
L;NE
1 survives
the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. On one hand, the low-stock incumbent obtains
ML
1 (x1) + ￿M
L
1(x1) in equilibrium. By instead deviating towards x
L;NE
1 , the highest pro￿t it























1 ) ￿ ML
1 (x1)+￿M
L
1(x1), which is true
since x1 < x
L;NE
1 . On the other hand, the high-stock incumbent obtains MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
1 (x1)
in equilibrium. By instead deviating towards x
L;NE
1 , the highest pro￿t it can obtain occurs after











1 ), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts
since MH
1 (x1) + ￿M
H
















by concavity. Therefore, both types of incumbent have incentives to deviate towards x
L;NE
1 and






= p, inducing no entry. Given these beliefs,
both types of incumbent deviate towards x
L;NE
1 , obtaining higher pro￿ts than in equilibrium.
Hence, the pooling strategy pro￿le in which both types select x1 < x
L;NE
1 violates the Intuitive
Criterion. ￿
11